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DIGNITY CONTRADICTIONS: RECONSTRUCTION AS
RESTORATION
TAJA-NIA Y. HENDERSON?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1867, in Rutherford County, Tennessee, W.H. Tilford initiated a le-
gal action against Stephen Tilford (a former slave) to have Stephen de-
clared legally insane.1 Records from the case indicate that Stephen had 
been “charged with lunacy.”2 Writing about the case, J.K. Nelson, an agent 
with the federal Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, noted that Stephen Tilford 
was neither “an idiot or lunatic or a man of unsound mind.”3 To the contra-
ry, Stephen Tilford was (and had been all his life) a deaf-mute: W.H. Til-
ford had, in effect, held out Stephen’s inability to speak (his physical 
disability) as proof of his alleged feeble-mindedness. Tilford’s strategy was 
successful. A Rutherford County jury found that Stephen was insane, and 
the court ordered him remanded into Tilford’s custody for the purpose of 
working on Tilford’s farm.4
Surviving Freedmen’s Bureau records indicate that, prior to emancipa-
tion, Stephen had been enslaved as the property of Tilford’s family; that the 
man had a reputation as “one of the best farm hands in Rutherford County”;
and that, after emancipation, Stephen had stayed on with the family—
”laboring hard” without pay—until late 1866, when he quit the farm to live 
with his own extended family.5 It was this decision—to quit the farm and 
deprive the Tilfords of his labor—that catalyzed the sequence of events 
? Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. The usual thanks go out to the editors of the Chicago-Kent 
Law Review and Professor Bernadette Atuahene for their expert editing of this Essay.
1. Reports of Outrages, Riots and Murders, Jan. 15, 1866–Aug. 12, 1868, Records of the Assis-
tant Commissioner for the State of Tennessee, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, & Abandoned Lands, 
1865–1869, microformed on M999, Roll 34 (National Archives Microfilm Publications), 
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/tennessee/outrages/tennoutrages2.htm [https://perma.cc/NM98-
J2A8].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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resulting in Stephen being subjected to a court-ordered confiscation of his 
labor (for a period of one year). He was, in effect, sentenced by the Ruther-
ford County Court to be the Tilfords’ slave—two years after the passage of 
the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.6
When the Freedmen’s Bureau inquired whether Stephen would like to 
return to the Tilfords to work for wages, the deaf-mute man used his index 
finger to draw a slicing sign across his neck.7 Employing a universally-
understood signal, Stephen communicated that he’d rather “cut his [own] 
throat” than return to the dominion of his former owners.8 Stephen’s sign 
for suicide motivated the local Bureau field agent to become involved in 
his case. In contemporaneous reports of the incident, the agent expressed 
disgust at the efforts of the Tilford family to steal Stephen’s labor without 
paying him a wage,9 and considered whether the federal government 
should seek to use military force to free Stephen from the custody of the 
Tilfords. In large part due to the efforts of the local Bureau agent, Stephen 
was eventually released into the custody of his own family and allowed to 
quit the Tilfords for good.10
The saga of Stephen Tilford reminds us that the labor and wage theft 
that was central to the institution of American chattel slavery did not cease 
with emancipation. In its place, emerged a system of purported “free labor” 
which bound freedpeople to the soil, restricted their movement, and kept 
them indebted, all at the risk of extreme violence (whether administered by 
the state or private parties). This Essay considers the utility of Bernadette 
Atuahene’s theory of dignity takings and dignity restoration in the context 
of American chattel slavery, emancipation, and Reconstruction. Here, I 
take up the challenge posed by Atuahene at the end of Chapter 1 to “ex-
plore whether the concept of dignity takings helps us to better understand” 
property atrocities in the United States, namely, the systematic disposses-
sion of black property rights in labor under slavery, Reconstruction and Jim 
Crow. Using slavery’s dismantling—specifically, emancipation and Recon-
struction (including the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments)—
as a qualitative case study, this Essay considers whether (and if so, how) 
Reconstruction functioned to restore dignity to formerly enslaved persons. I 
begin with the premise that American chattel slavery easily fits Atuahene’s 
theorization of dignity takings. According to Atuahene, “[a] dignity taking 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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occurs when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property 
rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional out-
come is dehumanization or infantilization.”11 Concomitantly, dignity resto-
ration “is a remedy that seeks to provide dispossessed individuals and 
communities with material compensation through processes that affirm 
their humanity and reinforce their agency.”12 The question I ask, however, 
is whether dignity takings and dignity restoration are clarifying lenses 
through which to consider the persistent harms of slavery and racialized 
subjugation. Using government policy in the immediate wake of the Civil 
War (specifically, the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau) as an example, I 
argue that remedial initiatives in the wake of racially-motivated property 
atrocities may function simultaneously as both dignity restoration and dig-
nity extraction. The resultant “dignity contradiction” suggests that property 
deprivation (in this case, the expropriation of labor) may not bring “con-
ceptual clarity”13 to efforts to craft compensatory regimes for the harms 
attendant to an entrenched slave regime. It may even be the case, as Dirk 
Hartog argued in his comment on coverture, that “the language of dignity 
and of dignity takings stands in the way of the project of finding redress for 
those distinctive and continuing wrongs.”14
As a federal agency backed by the military might of the federal gov-
ernment, the Freedmen’s Bureau stood in the gap for those freedpeople, 
like Stephen Tilford, who had been subjected to the “forced illiteracy”15 of 
the slave regime. Throughout the South, agents of the Bureau oversaw the 
resettlement of abandoned lands, investigated (and, in some cases, adjudi-
cated) the civil and criminal complaints of freedmen and women, assisted 
with the reunification of black families, disbursed military bounties and 
pensions, negotiated labor agreements, and (as laid bare in the case of Ste-
phen Tilford) acted as advocates both in, and outside of, court for the labor 
and property rights and bodily integrity of formerly enslaved persons. Bu-
reau agents acted as intermediaries tying the fate of the freedpeople to an 
arm of the federal government. This disruption of wide-scale labor theft 
11. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical 
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; see also 
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involun-
tary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
12. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 818.
13. Id.
14. Hendrik Hartog, Coverture and Dignity: A Comment, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833, 833 
(2016).
15. CHRISTOPHER HAGER, WORD BY WORD: EMANCIPATION AND THE ACT OF WRITING 33
(2013).
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and anti-black violence had clear dignity restoration intents and effects. As 
one author notes, “[i]n many cases the Freedmen’s Bureau offered the for-
mer slaves the first real protection ever allowed them before the law.”16
Simultaneously, Bureau personnel often acted against the attempts of 
freedpeople to exercise autonomy over their bodies or their labor. Bureau 
agents sided with planters, declined to investigate complaints of anti-black 
violence, withheld material support from defiant or unruly freedpeople, and 
encouraged (or more accurately, coerced) freedpeople to recommit their 
labor to the cultivation of cotton. The chronic inadequacy of Bureau re-
sources in some jurisdictions meant that “the needs and wants of the 
freedmen” in those states invariably went unaddressed or ignored.17 By 
tying freedpeople to the land, the Bureau limited mobility, depressed wag-
es, enriched planters, and helped cement a permanent underclass or “sub-
class” of black agricultural workers in the region.18 By these acts, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau presented a dignity contradiction—acting in its official 
government capacity to simultaneously perform both dignity extraction and 
dignity restoration.19
Part I of this Essay argues that chattel slavery was a dignity taking 
warranting restoration. Part II presents a historical sketch of the major ele-
ments of Reconstruction-era federal policy from 1865–1873, with special 
emphasis on the Freedmen’s Bureau. Part III argues that the Bureau had 
clear dignity restoration and dignity extraction properties. As the state’s 
interest in remedying the wage theft endemic to chattel slavery yielded to a 
policy of transforming formerly enslaved persons into disciplined wage 
workers in order to protect regional economic interests, the possibilities for 
redress for this particularized harm necessarily became constrained. The 
resulting dignity contradiction suggests that the conceptual framework of 
dignitary property may not be ideally suited for examining the harms at-
tendant to chattel slavery and its legacy.
16. JOHN DAVID SMITH, BLACK VOICES FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 63 (1997).
17. MARTIN ABBOTT, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1872, at 20–21
(1967); see also id. at 20 (“[T]here were several counties of [South Carolina] in which, a full year after 
the Bureau had begun to operate, the freedmen has never seen or felt its presence.”).
18. Id. at 76 (“No matter how hard they worked, during Reconstruction most blacks remained 
landless, poor, undereducated, and subject to white control.”).
19. As noted by Atuahene, “acts or institutions can be simultaneously dignity degrading and 
dignity enhancing.” Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 817.
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II. CHATTEL SLAVERY AS A DIGNITY TAKING
Before considering how the dismantling of American chattel slavery 
fits within Atuahene’s theory of dignity restoration, it is necessary to clari-
fy how chattel slavery itself effected a “taking.”
A. Labor as Property
Although governmental seizures of land and other real property form 
the target for the archetypal exercise of eminent domain, the takings clause 
of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to interests in land. Government 
appropriation of personal property is similarly subject to the Amendment’s 
limitations. The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in 2015’s 
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, noting that the state “has a categorical 
duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes 
your home.”20 This principal also holds true for labor, as state and federal 
courts have consistently acknowledged.21 Labor is property.
The philosopher most associated with the proprietary theory of labor 
is John Locke. In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke argued the 
centrality of labor to property acquisition. Since, according to Locke, labor 
was “the unquestionable property of the labourer,”22 then whatever the 
laborer produced, so too, was the laborer’s “unquestionable property.” By 
Locke’s reasoning, labor (the “work of his hands”) did not merely belong 
to the laborer, but also belonged to him exclusively.23 Among society’s 
various groups, disadvantaged landless persons (those for whom “there is 
not then enough and as good land left”24) have a special interest in labor as 
property.25 In the absence of land or capital, labor offers a property of last 
20. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2015).
21. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
22. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 
(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7P22-KUXM].
23. Id. (“[E]very man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. 
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”). Thomas Jefferson 
believed that the right to one’s labor was among the natural rights of man. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 292
(Samuel Eagle Forman ed., 1900) (referring to the right to “labor the earth” as “fundamental.”).
24. C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 212 (1962) 
(cited in Francis A. Citera, Vested Seniority Rights: A Conceptual Approach, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 
759–60 n.50 (1982)).
25. LOCKE, supra note 22, § 27; see JOHN LOCKE, THE FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 42 (C. & J. Rivington 1824) (1691) (“Charity gives every Man a 
title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to 
subsist otherwise . . . .”).
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This duty to redress is heightened when the original holders of the 
property are enslaved persons deemed to be inferior “sub persons.”32 Sub
persons are both dehumanized and infantilized by, and within, the polity;33
in the Kantian philosophical tradition, such persons are less (or not at all) 
deserving of ethical treatment. In the context of American chattel slavery, 
the loss of dignity occasioned by enslavement was catastrophic. As a digni-
ty denial, this extraction served to further instantiate the legal, economic, 
and social subordination of people of native and African descent in the 
U.S.34
Property confiscation and theft that targets sub persons entails more 
than mere loss of property; dignity itself is impaired. As Atuahene argues, 
the resultant dignity taking “involves involuntary property loss accompa-
nied by dehumanization or infantilization.”35 As defined by Atuahene in 
her 2016 article, dignity takings require four elements: (1) direct or indirect 
execution by the state; (2) destruction or confiscation of property; (3) from 
owners or occupiers; (4) where the intended or unintended result is dehu-
manization or infantilization.36
The property loss inhering in chattel slavery directly implicates the au-
thority and power of the state. As a system of domination, slavery places 
the labor (and by extension, the body) of the enslaved within the power of 
the enslaver.37 In the U.S. context, positive law provided the scaffolding for 
this domination, namely by excluding enslaved men and women from the 
category of property rights claimants.38 The state’s complicity in this sys-
ship Between the United States and African Americans: A Substantive Right to Reparations, 39 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525 (2015).
32. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 3 (2014).
33. Id. at 12 (“[T]he dispossessions in South Africa were part of a larger strategy that dehuman-
ized and infantilized blacks—they were dignity takings.”).
34. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 11 (1997) (defining the “racial contract” as 
the universe of agreements between and among those considered “white” to subordinate, exploit, and 
deny opportunities to nonwhites).
35. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 800.
36. ATUAHENE, supra note 32, at 26–34
37. See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH (1982).
38. See, e.g., Sanders v. Devereux, 25 Tex. Supp. 1, 11 (1860) (“The right of private property 
belongs, in this country, exclusively to freemen. The slave is denied this right as completely as he is the 
right of personal liberty. His person and his time being entirely the property of his master, whatever he 
may accumulate by his own labor, or may otherwise acquire, becomes immediately the property of his 
master . . . .”); In re Bodine’s Will, 34 Ky. 476, 477 (1836) (“Slaves are considered as property; the 
privilege of asserting rights, by judicial proceedings, is not, in general, conceded to them . . . . And 
therefore, the general rule is, and upon reasons of state, must be, that a slave can neither sue nor be 
sued.”); Poydras v. Mourain, 9 La. 492, 505 (1836) (“So far as regards the slaves, the power of the 
master is indeed absolute. The slave cannot resist, or be heard if he complain of the abuse of this pow-
er.”); Matilda v. Crenshaw, 12 Tenn. 299, 303 (1833) (“That the slave cannot sue the master is a general 
rule.”).
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tem was material and critical.39 In the U.S., federal, state and local gov-
ernments owned, leased, and sold slaves.40 Similarly, public law enforce-
ment personnel from federal marshals to local sheriffs hunted, returned, 
and “correct[ed]” suspected fugitive slaves.41 Put simply, the “government 
intervened in the master-slave relationship” with regularity.42 As 
Kaimipono David Wenger argues, “[t]he express language of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause—that slaves from each state were held ‘under the Laws 
thereof’—underscores that slavery was a creature of law and regulation, 
imposed over a baseline of freedom for all persons.”43 This direct involve-
ment of every level of American government in chattel slavery renders 
public the institution’s harms, including the confiscation (theft) of labor.44
Moreover, American chattel slavery hinged upon this state-sanctioned 
systematic dehumanization of enslaved persons. As Saidiya Hartman points 
out, the violence and terror visited upon enslaved persons was both routine 
and extraordinary.45 Slaveholders killed and maimed their human property 
with impunity.46 This quotidian process of dehumanization and terrorism 
relied upon and reinforced the sub person status of the enslaved. This phe-
nomenon was simultaneously both race-based and status-based, as both 
enslaved and free people of African descent fell vulnerable to its logic.
39. Brophy, supra note 31, at 121 (“The states established the legal framework that permitted the 
exploitation of African Americans. They established laws with the understanding that particular people
would be enslaved, separated from their families, denied education—just about everything that can be 
done to destroy a person’s humanity was contemplated or mandated by the laws of the slave states.”).
40. See Wenger, supra note 30, at 220 (“Government actors conducted a large percentage of slave 
auctions, allowing neutral devices such as probate and the seizure of debtors’ assets to become part of 
the slave trade.”).
41. See Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Property, Penalty, and (Racial) Profiling, 12 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 177, 179 (2016) (“As local law functionaries—constables, sheriffs, and jailors—systematized 
slave discipline, detention, rendition, and sale under the auspices of public authority, an administra-
tive and legal regime emerged whereby putative slaveowners called upon the state to secure, return, 
‘correct,’ and sell private property in persons.”).
42. PHILIP J. SCHWARZ, SLAVE LAWS IN VIRGINIA 11 (1996); see also Henderson, supra note 41,
at 178 (2016) (“Slaveholders routinely called upon local law enforcement personnel to assist with 
maintaining ‘the most rigid discipline’ among slaves.”).
43. Wenger, supra note 30, at 220–21.
44. See David Lyons, Reparations and Equal Opportunity, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 177, 182 
(2004) (arguing that slavery and Jim Crow “were in large part public, not private wrongs”).
45. See SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4 (1997) (describing the “terror of the mundane and quotidian”).
46. Colonial Virginia and South Carolina, for example, enacted laws absolving owners from any 
criminal liability for killing or maiming a slave where the death was associated with discipline or 
“correction.” See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, No. 57 S.C. Stat. 343 (1690), reprinted
in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 343 (David J. McCord ed., 1840). Virginia similarly 
“excus[ed] slave killings caused accidentally while ‘correcting’ them.” Alexander A. Reinert, Recon-
ceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C.
L. REV. 817, 835 (2016).
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III. SLAVERY’S DEMISE AND THE COMING OF RECONSTRUCTION
The preceding Part argues that the theft of labor intrinsic to the institu-
tion of chattel slavery in the U.S. satisfies Atuahene’s theoretical frame-
work for dignity takings. In this Section, I provide a brief timeline of 
federal policy towards the formerly enslaved in the years following eman-
cipation. The efforts of the Reconstruction-era Congress to bestow legal 
personhood to the formerly enslaved—as articulated in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, successive Freedmen’s Bureau bills, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866—had clear dignity restoration effects.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Ratified in December 1865,47 the Thirteenth Amendment abolished 
slavery and involuntary servitude in the U.S., “except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”48 The Amend-
ment’s sphere of protection extended (and extends), however, beyond hu-
man bondage. As tenBroek observed, the Amendment’s framers entrusted 
Congress, specifically, with a “constitutional mandate to enforce . . . not 
just the liberty of blacks but the liberty of the whites as well and included 
not just freedom from personal bondage but protection in a wide range of 
natural and constitutional rights.”49 Section 2 of the Amendment specifical-
ly “authorizes Congress to enforce that promise and create rights of belong-
ing—rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national 
community of the United States and facilitate equal membership in that 
community.”50
This anti-subordination ethos functions to bestow a baseline quantum 
of constitutional dignity upon the populace. In recognition of this function, 
the Amendment has been construed by the Supreme Court to ensure protec-
tion for all persons from the “badges and incidents of slavery.”51 The twin 
concepts of inclusion and dignity are key to this guarantee: “[A victim] 
need only be suffering today under conditions that could reasonably be 
called symptoms of a slave society, inability to raise a family with dignity 
47. Proclamation No. 52, William H. Seward, Secretary of State, 13 Stat. 774, 775 (Dec. 18, 
1865).
48. U.S. CONST. art. XIII.
49. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consum-
mation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 183 (1951).
50. Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009).
51. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, 
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561 (2012).
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caused by unemployment, poor schools and housing, and a lack of place in 
the body politic.”52
B. The Freedmen’s Bureau Acts53
The first Freedmen’s Bureau Act, passed in March 1865, established 
the Bureau as an agency within the War Department, and authorized its 
operation for a single year.54 The statute authorized the Secretary of War to 
“direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem need-
ful” for the temporary benefit of “destitute and suffering” freedpeople and 
refugees.55 Property redistribution was written into the text of the first 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act: Section 4 of the statute authorized the Bureau 
commissioner to “set apart” for lease up to forty acres of abandoned and 
confiscated lands for “loyal refugees and freedmen.”56
A Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which purported to extend the au-
thorization for the Bureau beyond the single year provided for in the earlier 
bill, was vetoed by Andrew Johnson.57 Congress overrode the president’s 
veto on July 16, 1866, thereby extending the agency’s work for an addi-
tional two years. This bill had included similar provisions for land redistri-
bution; however, instead of planning to redistribute confiscated 
Confederate lands to the refugees and freedmen, this bill targeted only “un-
occupied public lands.”58
The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act included express language au-
thorizing the Commissioner to “provide or cause to be erected suitable 
buildings for asylums and schools.”59 The Freedmen’s Bureau bills also 
52. Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1969).
53. See generally BRUCE FROHNER, THE AMERICAN NATION: PRIMARY SOURCES (2008) (repro-
ducing the Original Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, March 3, 1865; the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, 
December 4, 1865; and the First Reconstruction Act, establishing military districts throughout former 
Confederacy, March 2, 1867)).
54. Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (1865) (“That there is hereby 
established in the War Department, to continue during the present war of rebellion, and for one year 
thereafter, a bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands . . . .”). Congress clearly expected the 
Bureau’s to have a limited lifespan. In addition to its single year authorization, the legislation included 
no budget appropriation for the new agency. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 69 (1988). 
55. Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. at 508.
56. See id.
57. An Act to Enlarge Powers of the Freedmen’s Bureau, S. 60, 39th Cong. (1866) (“That the act 
to establish a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees . . . shall continue in force until otherwise 
provided by law . . . .”); see FONER, supra note 54, at 247 (noting that Johnson ultimately vetoed the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill of 1866).
58. S. 60 §4. 
59. Id.
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provided that the rights enumerated therein (including the right to hold 
property, give evidence, and bear arms) could be enforced in specially-
convened military courts (as opposed to local civil or criminal courts, 
which were believed to be hostile to enforcing any newly-bestowed 
“rights” upon the former slaves).
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that people born in the U.S. and 
not subject to any foreign power were entitled to be citizens, without regard 
to race, color, or (critically) previous condition of slavery or servitude.60
The Act also proclaimed that any citizen, as so defined, had the same rights 
as white citizens to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evi-
dence in court, and inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.61 Additionally, the Act guaranteed to all citizens the 
“full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
son and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and . . . like punishment, 
pains, and penalties . . . .”62 Persons found to have deprived citizens of 
these civil rights were to be “deemed guilty of a misdemeanor” crime.63
At least with respect to its provisions regarding citizenship, the 1866 
Civil Rights Act paralleled and presaged Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. New York Congressman Henry Raymond praised the Act as
“one of the most important bills ever presented to this House for its action.”
President Andrew Johnson found the bill so broad that he vetoed it (alt-
hough Congress would later override the President’s veto, firing the open-
ing salvo in the conflicts between the President and Congress and ushering 
in the period of broad-based remedial and punitive legislative enactments 
that came to be known as Radical Republicanism).
IV. THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND DIGNITY CONTRADICTIONS
With field agents posted throughout the South, bringing the spectre of 
federal authority to the most remote rural areas, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
arguably had a greater impact on the day-to-day lived experiences of for-
merly enslaved persons than either the Thirteenth Amendment or the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. The Bureau’s primary responsibility was “promoting 
60. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1982, 1987–88, 1991–92 (2016)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the welfare of the freedmen” through food and cloth relief rations,64 trans-
portation subsidies, mediation and arbitration of wage disputes between 
freedpeople and planters, and overseeing the establishment of schools.65
The Bureau provided support for the reunification of forcibly displaced 
black families in the region,66 and also adjudicated civil and criminal com-
plaints of freedmen (against both black and white defendants).67 In this 
work, the Bureau was central to the bestowing of dignity upon the formerly 
enslaved. In some areas, Bureau agents were even the first public officials 
to announce the coming of freedom.68 As a former slave from Burke Coun-
ty, Georgia recounted:
When freedom was declared, I went down to Augusta to de Freedman’s 
Bureau to see if ‘twas true, we was free . . . . De man got up and stated to 
de people: ‘You all is just as free as I am. You ain’t got no mistis [sic]
and no master. Work when you want.’69
In 1870, in his New Era newspaper, Frederick Douglass editorialized 
the Bureau as “the first friend of the freedmen, as their champion and de-
fender under military rule, and after the re-establishment of civil authority, 
as their advocate.”70
A. “The First Friend of the Freedmen”71: The Bureau’s Anti-
Whipping Campaign
64. Between 1865 and 1869, the Bureau issued a total of 20,135,930 rations to freedmen and 
refugees throughout the South. See PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN 
THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 98 (1904); see also HOWARD A. WHITE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 
IN LOUISIANA 66 (1970) (noting that, in Louisiana, “[r]ations consisted of pork or beef, flour or bread, 
corn meal, beans, peas, hominy, sugar, vinegar, candles, soap, salt, and pepper”).
65. MARTIN ABBOTT, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1872, at 23–24
(1967).
66. Id. at 50 (noting that, for South Carolina, “perhaps four thousand freedmen and possibly five 
hundred whites received free transportation from the Bureau to enable them to return to their original 
homes or to go to localities where they could find work”); see also GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY 
OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 86 (1970) (“Sometimes the Bureau’s officials were able to reunite hus-
bands and wives who had been separated as a result of slave sales, or in the hurried wartime migrations, 
and they succeeded in restoring some lost children to their parents.”).
67. See ABBOTT, supra note 65, at 24 (detailing the “endless stream of [freedmen’s] complaints 
to be heard, investigated, and acted upon” in South Carolina). See generally BENTLEY, supra note 66, at 
152–68 (detailing the efforts of the Bureau to secure civil and criminal justice for freedpeople).
68. Ruby Lorraine Radford, Slavery, in FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, SLAVE NARRATIVES: A
FOLK HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SLAVES 309, 347 
(1941) (“The Freedmen’s Bureau in Augusta gave out the news officially to the negroes . . . .”).
69. SMITH, supra note 16, at 26–27 (citation omitted).
70. Review of the Work of the Freeemen’s [sic] Bureau, NEW ERA (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 20, 
1870, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 16, at 63.
71. Id.
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In its role as “first friend” and as the mediator and arbitrator of labor 
disputes, the Bureau earned the ire of the planter class. In testimony before 
Congress, black politician Oscar J. Dunn testified that because of its work, 
“[t]he Freedman’s Bureau is a great eyesore to the planters; they do not like 
it at all.”72 The planters’ critique was attributable in part to the Bureau’s 
efforts to “end a lingering vestige of slavery—the whipping of blacks.”73 In
the minds of planters, the Bureau’s anti-whipping campaign interfered with 
their ability to “correct” or “discipline” the black workforce.74 Prior to 
emancipation, slaveholders had relied upon the spectacle of targeted brutal-
ity against individual slaves to instill terror and exact discipline among 
other slaves.75 The Bureau’s interference with this mode of discipline, 
therefore, compromised planters’ dominance and authority and threatened 
the “well being” of the racial order.76 When confronted by Bureau agents 
over the beating of a black girl in 1866, for example, A.J. White of Coving-
ton, Kentucky admitted to the beating, “saying that any person he em-
ployed would be corrected when doing wrong.”77 Another Kentucky 
planter insisted to Bureau agents that a woman on his plantation “wants to 
be a lady and I can do nothing with her without whipping her.”78 The 
woman’s refusal to submit to the planter’s authority posed a problem larger 
than simply recalcitrance; in his estimation, whipping her was “necessary 
for the well being of his plantation.”79
In an effort to counteract planter resistance to the Bureau’s “free la-
bor” modes of labor discipline, agents throughout the former Confederacy 
referred criminal charges to local courts in an attempt to eradicate the whip 
72. BACKGROUND FOR RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION: TESTIMONY TAKEN FROM THE HEARINGS OF 
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE MEMPHIS RIOTS AND 
MASSACRES, AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE NEW ORLEANS RIOTS, 1866 AND 1867, at 4 (Hans 
L. Trefousse ed., 1970).
73. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865–1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE,
AND “LEGAL LYNCHINGS” 24 (1990).
74. SMITH, supra note 16, at 66 (“White farmers and planters complained that the bureau’s rule 
against whites whipping blacks denied them an effective means to discipline their workers . . .”).
75. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN ET AL., REMEMBERING SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS TALK ABOUT 
THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION 140, 294 (1996) (transcribing the
testimony of Jordan Johnson wherein he recounted how his owners forced husbands “to stay dere” and 
watch their wives being whipped, “not darin’ even look like dey didn’t like it” (dialect in original));
Henderson, supra note 41, at 178 (observing how, in 1819, President James Monroe sought a public 
flogging for a recalcitrant slave on the grounds that such spectacles “served as an ‘example’ to others”
(citation omitted)).
76. WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 24.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 25.
79. Id.
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from southern labor relations.80 In Louisville, for example, Bureau agents 
went so far as to arrest white employers accused of using the whip against 
their employees.81 Louisiana Assistant Commissioner Thomas Conway 
ordered agents to “[b]e inflexible in your defense of the Freed-
men . . . . Arrest, try and punish old slave holders who commit violence 
upon the Freedmen.”82
B. Education, Voting, and Dignity
Central to the Bureau’s work was the establishment of schools for 
freed children and adults. As Mark Graber observes, the framers of the 
Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill identified education as one of the “central 
conditions of freedom and full citizenship” for the formerly enslaved.83 In
collaboration with Northern benevolent societies, the Bureau leveraged 
private and public capital for the construction, staffing, and maintenance of 
primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools for freedpeople throughout 
the region.84 In 1867, the Bureau Commissioner reported to Congress that 
the agency’s efforts to promote and secure an educational infrastructure for 
freedpeople had reached even “the remotest counties of each of the confed-
erate states.”85
With the passage of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867—and 
the extension of the franchise to black men in the South—Bureau agents 
80. See, e.g., MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN AND THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RACE,
GENDER, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 78–79 (2010) (collecting reports of 
Bureau agents referring cases involving planter violence against freedwomen in Virginia, Mississippi, 
Texas, and Georgia).
81. See id. (describing how “[i]n June 1867, [Bureau agents] arrested five whites for beating 
blacks and lodged them in the military prison”). The outcomes of such cases are unknown.
82. Conway to L.S. Butler, July 17, 1865, in WHITE, supra note 64, at 135.
83. Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 
1364 (2016) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hubbard) 
(“Another object is to give them an opportunity to learn to read . . . . They ought not to be left to perish 
by the wayside in poverty . . . .”)).
84. See Paul A. Cimbala, Making Good Yankees: The Freedmen’s Bureau and Education in 
Reconstruction Georgia, 1865–1870, reprinted in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK FREEDOM 
58?59 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994) (describing sentiments of Gen. Davis Tillson, fist assistant com-
missioner for Bureau in Georgia, who outlined the Bureau’s policy in the state as “to be the medium of 
distributing the charity of benevolent individuals and societies”). For example, thirteen colleges and 
universities were founded by the Bureau between 1866 and 1869. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE COLLEGE-
BRED NEGRO 12 (1900) (noting “[t]his group of schools was established directly after the war by 
Missionary and Freedmen’s Aid Societies under the protection and for the most part under the direct 
patronage of the Freedmen’s Bureau”).
85. Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, 
House Exec. Docs., 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2, Part 1, in WILLIAM H. BURKS, THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU, POLITICS, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH 68 n.31 
(M.M.A.S., U.S. Army Command & Gen. Staff Coll. 2009).
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also served as voter registrars.86 In June 1867, Louisiana Bureau commis-
sioner General Joseph Mower pressed agents “to make every effort for the 
instruction of the freedmen in order that they may vote intelligently.”87
These efforts threatened white political dominance in the state by organiz-
ing and protecting ballot access for the formerly enslaved.88 The agency’s 
facilitation of black political participation thus had clear dignity bestowing 
properties.
C. The Bureau as Dignity Extraction
In its dual roles as organizer of black labor and “mediator” of labor 
disputes, the Bureau pressured black agricultural workers to accept year-
long contracts. As Mary Farmer-Kaiser describes, the Bureau deployed 
vagrancy laws to “induce” former slaves into labor contracts:
Thus bureau labor policies ordered, first, that all freedpeople be urged to 
find work and make contracts and, second that those who rejected labor 
be considered vagrants, fined, imprisoned, and “hired out” to employers 
until they understood the virtue of honest toil.89
Bureau-approved labor contracts often provided that laborers were to 
paid at the end of the contract term and tied compensation to the produc-
tivity of the crop, thereby limiting mobility and bolstering planters’ authori-
ty over workers’ lives.90
When freedmen and freedwomen resisted Bureau efforts to bind them 
to the soil (and their former owners), Bureau agents castigated them for 
idleness. John William De Forest, an agent in Greenville, South Carolina, 
complained in his memoir that “myriads of women who once earned their 
own living now have aspirations to be like white ladies [and] instead of 
using the hoe, pass the days in dawdling over their trivial housework, or 
86. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 100 (“Throughout the South, agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
registered black voters.”).
87. WHITE, supra note 64, at 27 n.46 (1970).
88. Id. at 30 (“The New Orleans Picayune complained that the Bureau’s political indoctrination 
of freedmen was ‘an element of partisan strength . . . wielded entirely from the North, and a perpetual 
source of political weakness’ that rendered the white people politically impotent.”).
89. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 81.
90. Id. at 66 (“[Black farm laborers] complained that this restricted their freedom of movement 
and limited their right to take advantage of new economic opportunities.”); see LEON LITWACK, BEEN
IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 284–85, 408–28(1979) (detailing the coercive 
measures taken by Bureau agents in an effort to control black labor).
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gossiping with their neighbors.”91 In Louisiana, the Bureau “arrested and 
returned freedmen who had run away in default of their obligations.”92
Beyond the market distortions occasioned by its insistence upon year-
long contracts, Bureau agents were not unbiased arbiters of labor fairness. 
In jurisdictions where local whites were employed as Bureau agents, 
freedmen suffered. In Georgia, for example, “many [native white agents] 
clearly allied themselves with their white neighbors.”93 In 1867, for exam-
ple, the editor of the New Orleans Tribune—a publication that one author 
called “the voice of blacks in the lower Mississippi Valley”94—claimed 
that Bureau agents were “prejudiced” and unlikely to mete out “impartial 
justice” to the formerly enslaved:
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of 
his employer. Should he be abused or wronged what are the means of re-
dress? Practically he has none. If he goes to the Bureau’s agent, he finds 
there an officer who rides with his employer, who dines with him, and 
who drinks champaign [sic] with him.95
Beyond accusations of bias, Bureau agents were also directly impli-
cated in “outrages” against black workers. In Georgia, a Bureau agent hung 
a woman “by the thumbs for two hours and a half upon the representation 
[of her employer].”96
The Bureau’s role in land policy concerning the freedpeople was simi-
larly problematic. Although the Bureau also had primary administrative 
authority over federal land redistribution policy after 1865, less than one 
percent of former Confederate lands were ever vested in the hands of the 
agency.97 The Bureau’s inability to provide a secure path to landownership 
exacerbated regional economic disruptions and left the former slaves with 
“few alternatives to working for white landowners.”98
91. FARMER-KAISER, supra note 80, at 83 (citation omitted).
92. WHITE, supra note 64, at 122.
93. DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868, at 27 (1979). 
94. SMITH, supra note 16, at 99. 
95. Justice for All, TRIBUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 31, 1867, at 1, reprinted in SMITH, supra
note 16, at 74–75.
96. FARMER-KAISER, supra note 80, at 80. Reporting on a Georgia freedmen’s convention in 
1866, a Bureau official described that, at the hands of Bureau agents, “both men and women have been 
tied up by the thumbs for five hours.” NIEMAN, supra note 93, at 27 (citation omitted).
97. PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 129–30 (1904). 
98. Donald G. Nieman, Introduction to THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK FREEDOM, supra
note 85, at ix.
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Crafted in response to the “problem” of enslaved men and women 
seeking freedom behind Union lines, the Confiscation Act of 1861 declared 
all property “used for insurrectionary purposes” to be “the lawful subject of 
prize and capture” subject to seizure and conversion by the federal gov-
ernment.99 Notwithstanding the statute’s breadth, President Abraham Lin-
coln declined to pursue large-scale land confiscations, thereby hindering 
future efforts to redistribute such property to the freedpeople.100 The Sec-
ond Confiscation Act of 1862 similarly provided that confiscated lands “be 
condemned as enemies’ property and become the property of the United 
States,” and included explicit grants of freedom to those enslaved men and 
women either belonging to specified classes of persons-in-rebellion,101
captured by Union forces,102 or those fleeing to or living in areas under the 
control of Union forces.103 By its text, the Second Confiscation Act provid-
ed the statutory basis for large-scale seizures and redistribution of land to 
the freedpeople, and throughout the South, land trickled into the possession 
of former slaves. Federal military forces also executed on tax debts in re-
gions under Union control. In the South Carolina Sea Islands, for example, 
“the federal courts seized 76,775 acres of land for non-payment of the di-
rect tax,” and subsequently made the land available for sale to black heads 
of households.104 In 1862, General Benjamin Butler “established a system 
for leasing plantations and paying wages to former slaves” in Louisiana 
under the auspices of a sub-agency of the Department of the Gulf.105 In
1864, General Ulysses S. Grant organized a communitarian community of 
black farmers on lands formerly owned by Jefferson Davis and his broth-
er.106 Instead of ushering in a radical redistribution of land to the region’s 
freedpeople, however, these “rehearsals for reconstruction” were frustrated 
as “military necessity began to siphon away black farm workers.”107 Even
General Sherman’s Special Field Order No. 15—which purported to “re-
serve[] and set apart” land in the Georgia and South Carolina Sea Islands 
99. 12 Stat. 319 (1861).
100. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK 
LAND OWNERSHIP 2 (1978) (“Lincoln interpreted the [first Confiscation Act] conservatively.”).
101. Confiscation Acts, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
102. Id. § 9.
103. Id.
104. See OUBRE, supra note 100, at 8–11.
105. See id. at 13 n.28 (“In the Department of the Gulf the military agency assigned to provide for 
the freedmen was initially called the Freedmen’s Bureau (not to be confused with the Bureau of Refu-
gees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, which was not created until March, 1865).”).
106. See id. at 16–17.
107. Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1935, 1935 n.68 
(citing the settlement of former slaves on lands in the South Carolina Sea Islands) 
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“for the settlement of the negroes”108—failed to secure permanent property 
rights to the 40,000 resettled freedpeople: Five months later, Confederate 
owners of those lands, with presidential pardons in hand, returned to their 
estates to assert rights to which the Bureau acquiesced.109 Freedpeople 
recognized this expropriation of their possessory rights to land in favor of 
their former enslavers as a dignitary harm:
We were promised homesteads by the government. If it does not carry 
out the promises its agents made to us . . . we are left in a more unpleas-
ant condition than our former . . . You will see this is not the condition of 
really free men. You ask us to forgive the landowners of our island . . . 
The man who tied me to a tree and gave me 39 lashes; who stripped and 
flogged my mother & sister & who will not let me stay in his empty hut 
except I will do his planting & be satisfied with his price & who com-
bines with others to keep away land from me, well knowing I would not 
have anything to do with him if I had land of my own—that man, I can-
not well forgive.110
Land ownership was central to the former slaves’ conception of free-
dom.111
As one author described the Bureau’s conundrum surrounding land, 
“land distribution, however, because of jurisdictional disputes and divided 
authority, proved to be the most perplexing of the [Bureau’s] economic 
problems.”112 Ultimately, as a result, the Bureau was ill-equipped to effec-
108. William Tecumseh Sherman, Special Field Order No. 15: “Forty Acres and a Mule” (Jan. 16, 
1865), reprinted in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND 
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 365, 365–66 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
109. See OUBRE, supra note 95, at 49 (noting how, in September 1865, having received presiden-
tial pardons, “the former owners of land within the Sherman reservation . . . demanded that their lands 
be restored to them”); Special Field Orders No. 3 (Feb. 14, 1866), in S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-6, at 53-54
(1867); Report of R.K. Scott to Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, Commissioner (Nov. 1, 1866), in S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 39-6, at 114. Similar restoration efforts occurred throughout the former Confederacy. See
OUBRE, supra note 95, at 24–25 (describing the restoration of land to Confederate owners in South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia). 
110. Registers and Letters Received, Selected Series of Records, Record Group 105, Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen & Abandoned Lands, microformed on M752, Roll 19, 839–41 (National Ar-
chives), reprinted in OUBRE, supra note 95, at 53.
111. See also Paul A. Cimbala, A Black Colony in Dougherty County: The Freedmen’s Bureau and 
the Failure of Reconstruction in Southwest Georgia, 4 J. SW. GA. HIST. 72, 73 (1986) (“As Capt. A. P. 
Ketchum, a bureau officer and long-time sea island veteran, concluded at the end of Reconstruction’s
first summer, ‘the negro regards the ownership of land as a privilege that ought to be co-existent with 
his freedom.’” (citation omitted)). 
112. OUBRE, supra note 100, at 23; see also id. at 67 (“Some bureau officers helped the freedmen 
in every way possible to secure land immediately, while others, who were equally concerned about the 
welfare of the freedmen, preferred to establish them as workers until they had sufficient financial 
resources to become successful landowners.”).
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tuate large-scale land redistribution.113 As one historian of the agency ob-
served:
[T]he amount of land in the control of the bureau was relatively small. 
Only two-tenths of one per cent of the land in the insurrectionary states 
was ever held by the bureau. It would have been impossible to give even 
one acre to each family of freedmen.114
President Johnson’s amnesty and restoration policies further frustrated 
the ability of the Bureau to permanently transform the freedpeople into a 
landholding class.115 This entrenched landlessness stymied black self-
determination in the region and limited the economic mobility of those who 
had previously been promised “dignity” and “citizenship.”116
V. CONCLUSION
The Bureau was not the only arm of the federal government engaged 
in this dignitary give-and-take. Occupying federal military forces also 
worked to bestow and extract dignity and property from the formerly en-
slaved. As one Roanoke freedman noted in an 1865 petition to President 
Lincoln: “[T]hose head men have done every thing to us that our masters 
have done except by [sic] and sell us and now they are trying to starve the 
women and children to death cutting off they ration . . . .”117 The same 
petition further claimed that, in addition to “trying to starve” the freed peo-
ple, military officials were also conscripting black children into labor with-
out their parents’ consent: “[They] send them to Newbern to work to pay 
for they ration without they parent consint . . . . Some of these little 
ones . . . . Wasen oer 12 years old.”118 A petition by Louisiana freedmen 
protesting the mobilization of black labor by the Department of the Gulf 
under the leadership of General Nathaniel P. Banks similarly contended 
that Banks’s labor system “does not pratically [sic] differ from slavery, 
113. The Bureau did have some success with resettling freedpeople on condemned lands. In Beau-
fort County, South Carolina, under the leadership of black Bureau agent Martin R. Delaney, freedpeo-
ple purchased “the entire county of Beaufort, with the exception of the plantations bought by 
northerners at tax sales during the war.” OUBRE, supra note 100 at 69–70.
114. PEIRCE, supra note 97, at 129–30 (1904). 
115. Id.; see also OUBRE, supra note 100, at 35, 35–45. (describing how President Johnson “grad-
ually forced restoration of much of the property”).
116. See NIEMAN, supra note 93 at 221–22 (“Because the Bureau had lacked the ability to provide 
freedmen with land, blacks had no choice but to work as agricultural laborers, and consequently, they 
remained highly vulnerable to control by white landowners.”).
117. Letter from the Colored Men of Roanoke Island, N.C. (Mar. 9, 1865), in FREE AT LAST: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND THE CIVIL WAR 222, 224 (Ira Berlin & Barbara 
J. Fields eds., 1992).
118. Id. at 225–26 (dialect in original).
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